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Title: Evaluating Inputs of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis in Identifying Patient 




Purpose: There is a growing awareness on the use of systems approaches to improve patient 
safety and quality. While earlier studies evaluated the validity of such approaches to identify 
and mitigate patient safety risks, so far only little attention has been given to their inputs, 
such as structured brainstorming and use of system mapping approaches (SMAs), to 
understand their impact in the risk identification process. To address this gap, this study 
evaluates the inputs of well-known systems approach, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), in identifying patient safety risks in a real healthcare setting. 
Design: This study was conducted in a newly established Adult Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) service at Cambridge and Peterborough Foundation Trust in 
the UK. Three stakeholders of the chosen service together with the facilitators conducted an 
FMEA exercise along with a particular system diagram that was initially found as the most 
useful SMA by eight stakeholders of the service. 
Findings: In this study, it was found that the formal structure of FMEA adds value to the risk 
identification process through comprehensive system coverage with the help of the system 
diagram. However, results also indicates that the structured brainstorming refrains FMEA 
participants from identifying and imagining new risks since they follow the process 
predefined in the system diagram given. 
Conclusions: While this study shows the potential contribution of FMEA inputs, it also 
suggests that healthcare organisations should not depend solely on FMEA results when 
identifying patient safety risks; and therefore prioritising their safety concerns. 
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Introduction 
The problem of the high rate of medical errors and their serious consequences on patient 
safety and quality have been discussed in various studies since the pioneer report of the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM), To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (IOM, 2000). 
In response to this problem, one of the recommendations was made on risk management to 
provide substantial and sustainable improvements in patient safety and quality (Card et al., 
2014). 
Over the last few decades, risk management has gradually become a valuable tool to assist 
organisations in improving the effectiveness of care delivery (NPSA, 2006). As Vincent 
(2001) emphasized, risk management has matured in crucial ways, and has begun to have a 
positive impact on patient safety and quality of care, rather than simply addressing potential 
losses as a result of litigation. While retrospective methods, such as incident reporting and 
investigation, have been embedded in various healthcare contexts in the last two decades 
(Kurutkan et al., 2015; Simsekler, Card, Ruggeri, et al., 2015), proactive methods are still 
underused to identify patient safety risks (Simsekler, Card, Ward, et al., 2015; Simsekler et 
al., 2018a).   
Proactive risk management methods are in general systems approaches broadly and 
successfully utilised in other safety-critical industries, including chemical and aerospace 
industries (Ward et al., 2010). As suggested by earlier studies, healthcare can potentially be 
improved by learning from the experiences and methods used in other safety-critical 
industries to identify a comprehensive list of risks proactively. Since the nature of health 
systems is dynamic and complex, such systems approaches embedded in proactive methods 
seem crucial to accelerate improvement in patient safety and quality of care delivered 
(Carayon et al., 2014).  
While more than a hundred systems approaches are used in a range of safety-critical 
industries; most of the methods have not been applied in the healthcare field (Simsekler, 
Card, Ward, et al., 2015). From such methods, FMEA has got greater recognition in 
healthcare since 1990s, and, in turn, it is one of the most widely known and practiced 
proactive risk assessment tool (Ward et al., 2010).  
Due to its popularity, FMEA has been extended and similar methods were developed on it. 
These methods are called FMECA (Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis) and 
HFMEA (Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis). For instance, HFMEA was 
developed to make the structure of FMEA more appropriate to healthcare settings (Habraken 
et al., 2009). Providing the system details are available, HFMEA aims to help analyse system 
factors to identify hazards at a functional level (DeRosier et al., 2002). 
As a prospective hazard analysis approach, FMEA is used to identify the ways components, 
systems, or processes could fail to fulfil the intention of their design (ISO 31010, 2009). This 
approach is a well-documented process, requiring in-depth knowledge of the system studied 
(NASA, 1998); it therefore needs a strong multidisciplinary team, including a leader and 
members from different professional backgrounds with wide collective experience (Alamry et 
al., 2017).  
Despite the benefit FMEA has brought to healthcare because of its prospective nature, many 
limitations were also noted in the literature. These limitations were mainly about time and 
cost constraints, and the difficulty of gathering a team for the analysis (Lago et al., 2012). As 
Potts et al. (2014) emphasised, such issues may limit the effective use of FMEA in 
healthcare. For instance, van Tilburg et al. (2006) reported that the entire HFMEA process 
required more than seven meetings, a total of 140 man-hours, something generally difficult to 
arrange in healthcare settings where time and resources are limited. 
Further discussions have also addressed the validity of FMEA in the healthcare context 
(Franklin et al., 2012; Shebl et al., 2012). Several studies have shown that different 
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professional teams identified different risks for the same healthcare setting, and some 
discrepancies were found in the grading of the same risks (Ashley and Armitage, 2010; Shebl 
et al., 2009). Potts and colleagues (2014) also stated that it is not surprising that different 
outcomes can be reached by different teams in applying the same risk assessment tool 
because of the subjective nature of the analysis. Due to such issues, Shebl et al. (2012) 
proposed that healthcare organisations should not depend solely on the results of FMEA in 
prioritising patient safety issues. Apart from such issues, it was addressed that the tabular 
structure of an FMEA does not allow assessors to visualise the system and then identify some 
other potential risks in the system (Battles et al., 2006; Ward et al., 2010). As a result, the 
FMEA could not list all necessary risks and lead to unreliable risk identification unless it is 
supported by the use of system mapping approaches (SMAs, also known as process maps, 
process models and diagrams). In order to overcome such issues and improve the reliability 
of FMEA, use of SMAs are recommended along with FMEA exercises so as to visualise and 
capture potential failure points in a given system (Battles et al., 2006; Ward et al., 2010). In 
turn, a more comprehensive overview of risks could be identified and more reliable results 
could be achieved by the analysis.  
As the primary research on SMAs in healthcare risk assessment, Jun et al. (2009) evaluated 
the applicability of various mapping approaches in patient safety context. Following this 
research, Clarkson and his colleagues identified and shortlisted six SMAs, as below, in the 
Prospective Hazard Analysis (PHA) toolkit to provide fundamental visual representations in 
the application of prospective hazard analysis approaches (Clarkson et al., 2010).  
1- Task diagrams describe a hierarchy of operations and plans 
2- Information diagrams describe a hierarchy of information and/or material 
3- Organisational diagrams describe a hierarchy of people and/or roles within 
organisation(s) 
4- System diagrams represent how data are transferred through activities 
5- Flow diagrams represent activities occurring in sequence or in parallel 
6- Communication diagrams represent information and material flows between people and 
process 
A recent study also provided guideline to understand the capability of these six SMAS in 
identifying different risk sources, such as equipment-related risks, task-related risks, patient-
related risks, environmental risks, staff-related risks, communication risks, and organisational 
risks (Simsekler et al., 2018b). While all these studies evaluated the usability of SMAs in 
different healthcare settings (Clarkson et al., 2010; Jun et al., 2010; Simsekler et al., 2018), 
still only limited research results are available to validate the successful embedment of SMAs 
within the use of prospective hazard analysis tools, such as FMEA, and how helpful they are 
in risk identification within the scope of risk assessment.  
One another important outcome was a result discovered during the HFMEA exercise 
conducted by Potts and his colleagues (2014). The team raised a central patient safety issue, 
patient understanding, during the discussion in the HFMEA. However, this issue was not 
included in the final results of the HFMEA, as it did not readily fit the nature of the structured 
brainstorming process in FMEA. Many other issues, related to health and safety, hygiene, and 
sharps, were also discussed; these were also largely absent in the HFMEA results. This may 
be an important result, demonstrating that structured brainstorming as an input in HFMEA 
may hinder the imagination of new risks, or may cause safety issues to be disregarded that 
need to be included in the final results of the chosen method. 
Such issues lead us to address the question on the usability and utility of inputs - structured 
brainstorming and systems mapping approaches - in prospective risk management tools in 
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the healthcare context, particularly in the identification of patient safety risks. Therefore, in 
this study, we aim to understand how the use and selection of systems mapping approaches 
and the nature of brainstorming play a role in FMEA exercise. It is also vital to understand 
how such inputs are treated in the context of patient safety in the healthcare field. Therefore, 
this study integrates systems mapping approaches into a real FMEA exercise along with its 
brainstorming component to clarify how systems mapping approaches along with the 




Study Setting and Participants 
This study was carried out in a newly established service, called the Adult ADHD (Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) Service, based at the Cambridge Peterborough Foundation 
Trust (CPFT) in the UK. This service provides services to people experiencing ADHD after 
the age of seventeen. Having a multidisciplinary team of professionals, led by a consulting 
psychiatrist, the service pr vides specialist diagnostic services and delivers a range of 
pharmacological and psychosocial interventions for those with adult ADHD. 
Table I shows the characteristics of each participant including job title, the years of 
experience in the British National Health Service (NHS), experience on the use of SMAs and 
experience on risk assessment. 
 
Table I here 
 
As the primary step in this study, eight participants from the chosen healthcare setting were 
involved in individual workshops to evaluate the usability of the SMAs in their healthcare 
setting with the help of two facilitators, as shown in Table I. We first shortlisted six of the 
SMAs in accordance with the Prospective Hazard Analysis (PHA) toolkit (Clarkson et al., 
2010) to determine their potential contribution to general risk identification and to assess 
their ability to identify different types of risk sources. For the purpose of this study, the aim 
in the SMA evaluation was to help the stakeholders of the chosen service to select the best 
matching SMA to use throughout the FMEA exercise.  
As exclusively detailed in our recent study (Simsekler et al., 2018), the results showed that 
the system diagram was the most useful SMA to identify patient safety risks in the chosen 
healthcare setting since it includes a comprehensive view on system components, such as 
stakeholders, tasks, and data transfers throughout the process, in one picture (see Appendix).  
As the secondary step in this study, we conducted the FMEA exercise along with the most 
useful SMA – system diagram – identified in the primary step. For the FMEA exercise three 
participants and two facilitators were involved.  
 
Procedure 
At the beginning of the FMEA exercise, the facilitators, the research background, and the aim 
of the study were first introduced to the participants. The tabular structure of the FMEA 
process, as shown in Table II, was then introduced to the participants in greater detail as 
follows: 
1. Describing the system; identifying system components and system functions in order, 
by following the chosen SMA; system diagram  
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2. Identifying the failure modes 
3. Determining the potential cause of each failure mode 
4. Determining the immediate effect of each failure mode 
5. Determining the system consequences 
6. Determining the current controls 
7. Ranking the likelihood of failure mode effects 
8. Ranking the severity of failure mode effects 
9. Grading the risk (severity x likelihood; hence identifying low, medium, and high 
risks) 
 
Table II here 
 
The first two column headings in the FMEA table (component and function headings, as 
shown in Table II) were filled out by the facilitators by following the chosen system diagram. 
This served as the m in component of the bridge to be constructed between the system 
diagram and FMEA. Following the activity stages in the system diagram, each system 
component and function were identified for each possible risk. A range of failure modes 
associated with the functions were then listed by the facilitators.  
As shown in Table II, FMEA has no explicit risk identification process for identifying the 
risk components, such as hazard, cause, and effect. However, failure mode, potential cause, 
and immediate effect serve as equivalents that can be associated with risk identification. After 
identifying the failure modes, participants were asked to identify the potential cause, 
immediate effect, system consequence, and current control for each failure mode. After these, 
severity and likelihood dimensions were assessed for each component identified. These were 
then multiplied to arrive at the risk priority number, based on the grading matrix used by the 
Trust. Although Table II provides the whole process of the FMEA, in this study we focused 
solely on the first five steps, since they are the only ones relevant to risk identification within 
the scope of the risk assessment process.  
After completing the FMEA exercise, the participants were also asked to provide further 
comments on the use of system diagram and structured brainstorming process during the 
FMEA. Due to the limited number of participants and possibility to obtain limited 
quantitative results via statistical analysis, we verbally asked the following statements to the 
participants to gather their opinions for the purpose of the evaluation in the study. 
• Statement 1. I found FMEA is helpful in risk identification  
• Statement 2. Listing all potential failure modes in FMEA is helpful in risk identification 
• Statement 3. I found the use of system diagrams is helpful in risk identification 
• Statement 4. Brainstorming through FMEA is helpful in risk identification 
• Statement 5. The same risks can be identified without using FMEA 
• Statement 6. FMEA helped me become more aware of system-wide safety risks 
 
Results and Discussion 
In general, the FMEA session was constructive and interactive, with valuable insights con-
tributed by all participants. Team participation in risk identification, and then grading the 
risks, was high. The identified risks can be seen in Table III. 
 
Table III here 
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In general, FMEA exercise provided a direct link between system components and risk com-
ponents. We identified 22 risks (see Table III) from the part of the system that we were able 
to cover in the course of the FMEA exercise. It was helpful to rank the system elements in 
terms of risks. It was observed that the success of the risk identification process in FMEA 
was primarily related to the system description provided by the system diagram, which 
helped define system components, functions, and failure modes, in order. We also found that 
the FMEA success was related to the motivation of the participants in the brainstorming 
session. It was noted that participants’ positive motivation could enhance the risk 
identification process by identifying multiple causes and effects for each failure mode.  
During the FMEA exercise, the participants found the system diagram very helpful. It is a 
relatively new finding of this study that service users were given freedom to select the most 
suitable SMA; a valuable insight into the study was gained because the users chose the 
diagram. Although the use of the system diagram provided a contribution to this research, it 
was also determined that this helped identify known risks, within the limits of its capability, 
as found in an earlier study (Colligan et al., 2010). Due to the nature of the system diagram, 
no external risks were captured — a fact criticised by the participants concerned with critical 
safety issues in the service. It can therefore be assumed that the validity of FMEA is relevant 
to the chosen SMA, and its power to represent the system. It should also be noted that with 
FMEA, the role of facilitators is in general very important. In this case, although the 
facilitators had had experience with PHA in general, the current study was the first in which 
they had served as facilitators; this too might have had an impact on the quality of the results.  
At the end of the FMEA session, we verbally asked six statements to gather the participants’ 
opinions on the overall study. As mentioned in the first statement, the participants found the 
FMEA to be an acceptable and positive approach towards identifying risks proactively. 
Throughout the FMEA exercise, listing all potential failure modes in a spreadsheet was 
helpful in identifying risks in a useful manner. Further, the participants indicated that the 
system diagram was helpful in guiding the analysis of risk identification though it was limited 
to identify environmental risks. They also stated that while they became more aware of 
system-wide safety risks, they were still not sure whether FMEA was helpful in covering all 
relevant risks in their healthcare service. Further, participants mentioned that they had 
expected to be able to address some important concerns they had about the service, but 
following the structure given in the system diagram prevented them from raising these 
concerns and even imagining new risks. The participants also pointed out the importance of 
the facilitators’ role in completely considering all system functions within the time allotted 
for the FMEA exercise. 
As experienced in an earlier study (Potts et al., 2014), a potential limitation of FMEA was 
found in the identification of external and environmental risks, as they were not addressed in 
the chosen system diagram. For instance, during the FMEA exercise one participant 
highlighted an issue regarding the physical environment of the service. However, this issue 
was not included in the FMEA result, since the failure modes were only identified based on 
the process steps shown in the system diagram, and no identification of external risks was 
allowed. Therefore it can be shown that the structured brainstorming through the use of 
system diagram or any other types of diagrams, such as work flow diagram, in FMEA may 
refrain participants from identifying some other types of risks that are out of the scope of the 
chosen diagram. With such limitations, it can be said that the outputs from FMEA should not 
be relied upon in isolation as highlighted in earlier studies (Shebl et al., 2009). Therefore, 
they should be treated as a valuable output supporting the overall risk identification in any 
chosen healthcare settings. Some recent studies also supported the value of FMEA in 
particular healthcare settings, and indicated that FMEA can be an effective approach for 
quality improvement (Alamry et al., 2017; Rosen et al., 2015). 
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As experienced in earlier studies (Ashley and Armitage, 2010; Shebl et al., 2009), it can be 
said that different results might be obtained with different and/or more participants in another 
longer study, but it was observed that the limited number of participants allowed for more 
accurate capture of the perceptions of the participants. As shown in earlier studies (Ashley 
and Armitage, 2010; Potts et al., 2014), although participants had differing views on potential 
risks in some cases, they were easily able to reach a consensus during the analysis of each 
failure mode. Considering how little time for risk assessment is often allotted in healthcare, it 
is worth remembering that a small group of people can often reach consensus quickly.  
It can be concluded that the efficacy of FMEA was directly affected by the chosen SMA 
(system diagram in this study), time, the experience of facilitators and participants, the 
number of participants, and their motivation as a multidisciplinary team. Having better 
options available for these factors may provide better results on the validity of FMEA that 
was addressed in earlier studies (Potts et al., 2014; Shebl et al., 2012). Further, practical 
aspect of the FMEA will also be enhanced through a better use of inputs, such as selecting the 
most helpful system mapping approaches and using the knowledge and experience of 
facilitator and particip nts during the brainstorming session. 
Conclusions 
This study addressed and elaborated the impact of the primary inputs – SMAs and structured 
brainstorming – utilised throughout the FMEA exercise. Regarding the results of the FMEA 
exercise, it can be said that FMEA has merit in risk identification, but also had limitations 
experiences in this study.  
It was concluded that FMEA provided a useful opportunity for detailed risk identification 
using system diagram along with structured brainstorming, but healthcare organisations 
should not depend solely on the results of the FMEA in identifying patient safety risks. 
However, the primary inputs of this approach, such as brainstorming and SMAs, would 
contribute to the improvement of current risk identification practices with a better adaptation 
to the healthcare context. 
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Appendix: System diagram used throughout the FMEA exercise (for further information on SMAs, please see Simsekler et al. 2018b)
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Tables  
No Job title Experience 










1 Service Manager 28 years Medium ✓   
2 Consultant Psychiatrist 24 years Very familiar ✓ ✓ Medium 
3 Specialist Psychiatrist 10 years Medium ✓   
4 Admin Support 3.5 years Not familiar at all ✓   
5 Clinical Psychologist 13 years Not familiar at all ✓ ✓ A little 
6 Clinical Psychologist 5 years Not familiar at all ✓ ✓ A little 
7 Specialty Registrar 12 years Medium ✓   
8 Nurse Specialist 24 years Medium ✓   
Table I Participants Information 
 











Likelihood Severity Risk 
1 
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ID Component Function Failure mode Potential cause Immediate effect 
1 Admin or 
Manager 
Check documents Partial failure - fail to 
check all documents 
Overtasking Clinicians receive incomplete 
patient information 
2 Admin or 
Manager 
Check documents Untimely operate - check 
documents late 
Overtasking Delay patient admission and 
assessment 
3 Nurse prescriber Review document Untimely operate - 
review documents late 
Overtasking Delay patient admission and 
assessment 
4 Admin or 
Manager 
Add patient to 
waiting list 
Complete failure - fail to 
add patient to WL 
Inadequate IT facilities Miss patient admission and 
assessment 
5 Admin or 
Manager 
Add patient to 
waiting list 
Incorrectly operate - 
appointment date/time 
incorrectly added 
Inadequate IT facilities Delay patient assessment 





Complete failure - fail to 
send 
Inadequate IT facilities Miss patient admission and 
assessment 





Incorrectly operate - 
send incorrect 
appointment date/time 
Inadequate IT facilities Delay patient assessment 





Incorrectly operate - 
send to incorrect address 
Incorrect information 
from GP 
Delay patient assessment 
9 Psychiatrist Conduct psychiatric 
interview 
Incorrectly operate - 
conduct interview 
incorrectly 
Inexperienced trainee Incorrect diagnosis 
10 Psychiatrist Conduct psychiatric 
interview 
Untimely operate - 
interview patient late 
Overtasking Delay patient assessment 
11 Psychiatrist Review 
neurodevelopmental 
history 
Untimely operate - 




Delay patient assessment 
12 Psychiatrist Generate 
assessment report 
Untimely operate - 
generate report late 
Overtasking Delay patient treatment 
13 Psychologist Conduct psychiatric 
interview 
Incorrectly operate - 
conduct interview 
incorrectly 
Inexperienced trainee Incorrect diagnosis 
14 Psychologist Conduct psychiatric 
interview 
Untimely operate - 
interview patient late 
Overtasking Delay patient assessment 
15 Psychologist Review 
neurodevelopmental 
history 
Untimely operate - 




Delay patient assessment 
16 Psychologist Generate 
assessment report 
Untimely operate - 
generate report late 
Overtasking Delay patient treatment 
17 Nurse prescriber Conduct pre-drug 
assessment 
Untimely operate - 
conduct assessment late 
Clinical equipment 
problem 
Delay pre-drug assessment 
18 Nurse prescriber Provide dose 
titration & 
monitoring service 
Partial failure - fail to 
provide complete 
monitoring service 
Patients don't attend 
monitoring session 
Complete medical treatment 
failure 
19 Nurse prescriber Provide dose 
titration & 
monitoring service 
Incorrectly operate - 
titration is incorrect  
Patients don't follow 
instructions 
Overdosing 
20 Psychiatrist Supervising 
prescribing 
Untimely operate - fail to 
supervise in time 
Overtasking Delay patient medical treatment 
21 Admin or 
Manager 
Discharge patient to 
primary care 
Incorrectly operate - 
discharge patient without 
proper follow-up 
No shared protocol with 
GP 
GP is unable to carry out 
prescribing & monitoring 
22 Admin or 
Manager 
Discharge patient to 
primary care 
Untimely operate - 
unable to send discharge 
documents in time  
Inadequate IT facilities Delay patient discharge 
Table III Risks identified in the FMEA session 
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